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In societies that are horizontally fragmented between identity-based social groups, electoral 
competition is often motivated by the desire to use public office to advance group interests 
(Alesina et al., 1999, Bates, 1983, i Miquel, 2007). We focus on the case of Turkey to study group 
favoritism in such a context. Rigorous individual-level empirical study of this question has so far 
remained limited since official household income surveys in Turkey do not include questions about 
religion and religiosity. We fill this gap by exploiting individual-level polling data that spans the 
available 2012-2018 period in pooled cross-sectional fashion, and analyzing whether age cohorts 
that joined the labor market before and after AKP came to power experience varying outcomes in 
employment and income depending on their religion and religiosity. We find that under AKP rule 
pious Sunnis displayed significant improvement in the ratio of those in public sector employment 
(especially for women) and private high-status jobs (especially for men). In fact, for the youngest 
cohorts, the gap between pious Sunnis and others in public employment has already closed. 
Finally, gaps in income per capita between pious Sunni and others are narrowing only for the 
youngest cohorts. Our findings suggest that AKP governments use public employment to reward 









Turkey, public sector employment, patronage, Political Islam, event study design, clientelism 
 
JEL Codes 
D73, J45, J71, D72, Z13 
 
Acknowledgments  
The authors are grateful for comments from Doruk Cengiz, Gözde Çörekçioğlu, Bilge Erten and 
the participants of the Kadir Has University Economics Seminar, Boğaziçi University Political 
Science Colloquium, PEGFA Seminar at the University of Greenwich and two seminars at Koç 
University. We also would like to thank Sümeyye Karabacak for assisting data collection. 
Greenwich Papers in Political Economy are intended to make results of research at the University 
of Greenwich available to other researchers in preliminary form for discussion and suggestions 
for revision before publication. 
 
Corresponding author 
Cem Oyvat, Senior Lecturer in Economics, University of Greenwich, Department of Economics 
and International Business, Old Royal Naval College Park Row, SE10 9LS, London, United 






In societies that are horizontally fragmented between identity-based social groups, electoral 
competition is often motivated by the desire to use public office to advance group interests (Alesina 
et al., 1999, Bates 1983, i Miquel 2007). Office holding politicians’ ability to direct state resources 
to the favored group, however, will be limited when the state does not have access to su bstantial 
natural resource or foreign aid rent. Furthermore, politicians may not prefer to engage in costly 
resource distribution if they can take the political support of their in -group for granted due to 
alignment on non-economic goals. Lastly, distribution will be difficult if social groups are not 
distinguished from each other with visible identity markers.  
We focus on the difficult case of Turkey to study group favoritism in a context marked by 
relatively permeable group boundaries and a diversified non-resource economy. The chief 
politically salient cleavage of interest in Turkey is one that runs between secularism and Sunni 
Muslim piety. Grievances of the pious constituency against a perceived secular establishment has 
been an important part of the discourse espoused by Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development 
Party (AKP after its Turkish initials). Since the party came to power in 2002 it has been widely 
argued that the relationship between these groups and state power has changed, with concomitant 
economic outcomes (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014). In this paper we empirically analyze whether 
AKP’s time in office has actually been associated with a relative improvement in the education, 
employment and income status of pious Sunnis.  
Rigorous individual-level empirical study of this question has so far remained limited since 
official household income surveys in Turkey do not include questions about ethnicity or religiosity. 
We fill this gap by exploiting the Barometre series of KONDA—a respected private polling 
company, which surveys representative samples of Turkey’s adult population monthly. We pursue 
an innovative analysis strategy by exploiting individual-level survey data that spans the available 
2012-2018 period in pooled cross-sectional fashion, and investigate whether age cohorts that 
joined the labor market before and after AKP came to power in 2002 experience varying outcomes 
in employment and income depending on their religious affiliation. 
Public sector recruitment in Turkey is highly structured: recruits in 2000s are mostly 
university graduates who have to take Civil Servant Selection Exam (KPSS). KPSS tends to 
preclude the first-time recruitment of older people since fresh university graduates excel more 
easily in this competitive academic exam. As a result, most public employee recruits are in their 
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early twenties. We use this institutional constraint to construct our empirical strategy given that 
our data is only from the AKP period (i.e. we do not have surveys from pre-AKP period). If AKP 
is showing preferential treatment to its core constituency, public employment for pious Sunni 
cohorts whose early twenties correspond to AKP’s term in office shall increase compare to others 
as well as earlier pious Sunni cohorts. This is indeed what we find. 
For older cohorts, being pious Sunni (PS) is associated with lower education; as well as 
lower employment and income. But for younger cohorts who likely entered labor market under 
AKP, being PS became an advantage for women, especially born in 1990s, and (less) for men too 
in the public sector. For high-status private sector jobs, being a pious Sunni became advantageous 
only for men. There is some evidence for closing of income gaps between poorer PS and others, 
but only for younger cohorts. All cohort differences hold with education controlled, despite closing 
of education gap as well.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
A wide and growing literature studies how identity-based group competition affects 
economic and political outcomes. There is evidence suggesting that ethno-linguistic or ethno-
religious diversity adversely affects economic growth (Easterly & Levine, 1997, Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol, 2005a, Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005), quality of government 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Casey & Owen, 2014), schooling (Alesina et al., 2003; Casey & Owen, 
2014), and chances for violent conflict (Esteban & Ray 1999, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005b). 
Although linguistic divides are generally seen as the hallmark of ethnic identity, Fox (1997: 17) 
finds that “most definitions of ethnicity include religion” and finds that 37 percent of conflicts 
between ethnic groups involve religious grievances as a cause. Reynal-Querol (2002) estimates 
that religious differences are a social cleavage more important than linguistic differences in the 
development of civil war. 
The literature on identity-based group competition points to lack of cooperation between 
groups for public goods provision as a chief mechanism that links diversity to undesirable 
economic and political outcomes (Alesina et al.,1999, Banerjee et al., 2005, Habyarimana et al., 
2007, i Miquel 2007; Desmet et al., 2012). An instrumentalist tradition (Bates, 1983; Chandra, 
2004) argues that ethnic identities provide a suitable basis for competition over politica l goods 
because they are useful boundary-enforcing devices to prevent leakage of spoils to the outgroup. 
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For Ghana, Collier and Garg (1999) document that ethnic and kin relations are rewarded with 
higher wages in the public sector. Studying 18 African countries, Franck and Rainer (2012) find 
that ethnic groups enjoy increases in schooling and literacy rates and reductions in infant mortality 
above the rates that apply to the general population when the national leader is their co -ethnic. 
Moreover, for 140 multi-ethnic countries, De Luca et al. (2018) find that political leaders’ ethnic 
homelands have significantly greater nighttime light intensity and regional GDP compared to other 
ethnographic regions of the same country. 
However, the salience of group identity is contextual and should not be taken for granted. 
When more than one marker defines a group, group identity is stronger; whereas cross -cutting 
social identities may reduce the political salience of category distinctions (Dunning & Harrison, 
2010; Mancini, 2016; Roemer et al., 2007). Group boundaries can also change over time through 
processes of differentiation and assimilation (Horowitz, 1985), so not all boundaries are equally 
effective ways of enforcing group membership. Markers that are more easily observed from the 
outside—like skin color—will give rise to more impermeable group boundaries and more intense 
competition (Caselli & Coleman, 2013). Some studies point to a growing divide within Western 
nations between very religious segments of the population and segments removed from religion, 
with a concomitant tribalization in political and lifestyle choices (Putnam and Campbell, 2010; 
van der Brug, et al., 2009; Wilkins-Laflamme, 2014). Unless these religious divides are reflected 
in markers such as dress codes, for example, we can predict that their impact on political 
competition will remain limited.   
Furthermore, even where groups are more decisively delineated, the efficacy of public 
resource distribution to co-ethnic and co-religious groups by office holders is not guaranteed. First, 
office-seeking politicians are not incentivized to allocate resources to their core group if, due to 
taste alignment and better monitoring within group, the political return to allocation is greater 
elsewhere (Kasara, 2007; Casas, 2020). Secondly, even where the politicians prefer to further their 
group’s interests, how effectively this can be done via public policy depends on the economic 
structure. An illustrative case is Malaysia, where governments tried to promote ethnic-Malay 
population through public sector jobs but because export promotion for the private sector 
implemented during the same period generated the largest income growth effect for non -Malay 
groups, between 1970 and 2010 the policy mix had modest effect in closing the income gap faced 
by Malays (Saari et al., 2015). This suggests that group favoritism via government largesse will 
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be less effective where economic activity is not dominated by appropriable rents, most typically 
generated by natural resource extraction.  
In short, given social cleavages that horizontally divide the society, office holders may 
direct state resources to the favored group, however, their ability to do so will be limited where 
the cleavages are more permeable and where the state does not have substantial access to 
appropriable rents. Turkey is a somewhat difficult case considering that its social cleavages 
between ethno-linguistic and religious communities are short of clear racial divides and  it has a 
diversified economy. In such non-resource-based contexts, the most important policy tool to 
advance group interests may be job cronyism. Politicians may disproportionately give public jobs 
to members of their in-group, and they may use their power to cultivate and support a business 
clientele so that more and better jobs will become available for the group in the private sector too. 
While the use of patronage jobs in the public sector has recently been studied by Colonnelli et al. 
(2020) and Mocetti and Orlando (2019), the question of politically motivated distribution of 
private sector jobs remains understudied. We show that in Turkey the term in office of a religiously 
conservative party has resulted in occupational gains for pious Sunni individuals in public as well 
the private sector, however, closing the income gap with the more secular people remained a more 
elusive task. In the next section we describe the Turkish case in greater detail.  
 
3. Group Competition and Public Policy in Turkey  
3.1. Relevant Groups 
Two politically salient social cleavages dominate contemporary Turkey, one that runs 
between secularism and Sunni Muslim piety, and one that runs between the ethnic Turkish majority 
and the Kurdish minority (Mardin, 1973; Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006). Since the coming to power 
of AKP in 2002, the structure of political power in Turkey has been increasingly shaped by this 
right-wing conservative party’s aspiration to hegemony, in competition with more secular political 
actors. Even though in its early years the party promised a pluralistic governance vision in line 
with European Union guidelines, as it consolidated its power its rule has become decisively more 
authoritarian and its discourse more explicitly associated with the Sunni Muslim conservatism of 
the country’s inner regions. The allegedly lower status accorded to this constituency by Turkey’s 
previously secular establishment generated grievances that have been framed in the party discourse 
in almost ethnic division terms. Party leader Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly referred to his people 
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as “Turkey’s blacks,” denoting an experience of negative discrimination. 1 As Demiralp (2012) 
comments, the grievance comes with a baggage of associated characteristics and somewhat visible 
identity markers: 
The ‘white–black’ dichotomy or the Islamism–secularism conflict in Turkey was not merely 
a clash over religious outlook. Erdoğan was ‘black’ not just because he was a practising 
Muslim, but also because he was from provincial Anatolia, namely taşra, the ‘inlands’. His 
Muslimhood was rather a clue, just like his Anatolian accent, body language, expressions, 
outfits and even physical features, giving away his ‘rural’, ‘common’ and therefore 
‘inferior’ status.  
 
It should be noted that while the association of Islamic conservatism with rural and economically 
inferior status has been a useful discursive instrument for political mobilization, it glosses over a 
complex pattern of historical realignments. During the twentieth century Turkey’s state-led 
secularization project had been most successful in the richer, Western coastal provinces with closer 
commercial relations with Europe; but elsewhere in the country this project found wiling partners 
in rural pockets of Alevism. Alevis are a heterodox community loosely associated with Shiite 
Islam. Though originally a persecuted community, Alevis found opportunities for economic 
mobility with Turkey’s industrialization, due in part to their enthusiastic participation in secular 
education. In our sample, self -identified Alevis have significantly higher household income 
compared to the Sunni majority2—probably a relatively recent turnaround of a centuries-long 
previous pattern. However, as Buğra and Savaşkan note, with growing AKP power, “the rise of 
religious conservatism generated feelings of exclusion and marginalization among certain 
segments of the population. People who constitute a sizable minority, especially those belonging 
to the heterodox Alevi sect, said to constitute about 20 percent of the population, began to feel that 
they could no longer live like they used to do in Anatolian provinces as the imprint of Sunni Islam 
was becoming increasingly strong in daily life and social relations” (2014: 61). Indeed, studies on 
the Alevi population find widespread experience of discrimination (Erdemir et al. 2010a), 
including in job interviews and in the workplace (Erdemir et al. 2010b).  
In this study we analyze whether AKP’s term in office has indeed improved the economic 
status of the pious Sunnis compared to the most significant out-groups. Based on survey data, we 
 
1 ‘Türkiye’nin Zencileri’, Tempo, 23 March 2006, https://www.internethaber.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-o-
zenciler-biziz-video-galerisi-1880050.htm 
2 Average equivalized household incomes for Alevis were, in 2018, 12.8% higher and, in 2013, 7.0% higher than 
Sunnis according to our calculations from Konda Barometre data. 
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construct an out-group based on self-reported religiosity and religious sect. For want of a better 
term, we call this out-group as “seculars,” and include anybody who does not identify as a Sunni 
Muslim (hence all self-reported Alevis) as well as those professing low (or no) religiosity.3 Hence 
the in-group consists of pious Sunnis. 
While AKP government’s identification with Sunni piety has been widely recognized, its 
positioning on the Turkish-Kurdish cleavage axis has varied in time. On the one hand, AKP 
governments launched unprecedented reforms to recognize Kurdish cultural identity, and even 
experimented with peace talks with the Kurdish armed insurgency organization PKK. However, 
once the peace talks seemed to reduce AKP’s wider popularity across the country, the party shifted 
to an uncompromising stance towards Kurdish political demands and insurgent activity (Arat and 
Pamuk, 2019). To this day, nonetheless, AKP remains as the second most popular party in the 
predominantly Kurdish-populated provinces, after HDP—the party associated with the Kurdish 
political movement. It is therefore not clear what kind of change to expect in terms of the economic 
status of Kurdish individuals under AKP. In this study we do examine the ethnic Kurds as a 
separate group and largely find that membership in this group was not associated with significant 
changes over the baseline trends. In fact, the differences between pious Sunnis and other people 
also hold within the Kurdish group. We are thus organizing our presentation around the pious-
secular cleavage as our chief cleavage of interest, and we will note our findings on Kurds on the 
side (see Appendix D). 
We are not examining the changing economic status of party voters. This is because, first, 
changing one’s vote is easy and it may happen precisely due to the economic changes incurred 
under the incumbent government—introducing the issue of reverse causation (Yagci and Oyvat, 
2020). Secondly, under the secret ballot system that Turkey implements it is relatively easy to 
pretend to be a pro-incumbent voter if one wants to do so to avoid job market-related and other 
kinds of policy discrimination. However, social identities come with visible identity markers that 
are more difficult to change or simulate. We are interested in how people’s durable social group 
identities affect their economic fortunes, which we find a more interesting theoretical question.   
 
3 In a detailed study of Alevi religious and political identity in Turkey, Çarkoğlu (2005) found that “as the degree of 
Alevi orientation increases, the degree of religious conservatism as reflected in the faith, attitudes and worship  
dimensions of religiosity drops significantly,” in addition, the tendency to vote for AKP drops substantially. Self-
reported religiosity among Alevis seems to have a different social and political meaning than among Sunni people and 
therefore it makes sense to categorize them together with those with low (or no) religiosity. 
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3.2. Group Markers and Behavior in the Labor Market  
The most visible identity marker associated with the imprint of Sunni piety involves female 
behavioral and dress code. Whereas in rural areas women of all groups may cover their hair, 
especially in urban areas women’s headscarf signals a pious lifestyle. The secular old guard sought 
to discourage this lifestyle by negatively responding to the signal: Until reforms enacted in the 
2000s by the AKP governments, women wearing headscarves were not allowed to universities and 
could not be employed as public servants. For males, it is more difficult to tell type from looks 
unless the females in the household can be observed (the reason why entrance examinations for 
military schools, for example, involved inspection visits to candidates’ home) but facial hair and 
accessories with religious connotations could provide clues. Another marker visible to government 
officials as well as potential employers could be given names. Conspicuously irreligious given 
names—such as Evrim (Evolution)—can signal that the individual does not hail from a 
conservative family background. In addition, certain names associated with the historical rift 
between the Sunni and Alevi-Shiite traditions are disproportionately preferred by members of 
particular groups, while others are seen as anathema and never used.4  
Consequently, group differences are greatest when it comes to the status women. Several 
empirical studies find that religiosity and associated patriarchal norms significantly reduce 
women’s labor participation. Using indices of religious practices (prayer and fasting), Dildar 
(2015) estimates that both religiosity and patriarchy significantly reduces women’s likelihood of 
labor force participation in the urban areas. Similarly, Atasoy (2016) uses the number of mosques 
in the region of birth as an instrument for an individual’s endorsement of the idea that women 
should be “isolated from social and business life,” and finds that women endorsing isolation are 
less likely to participate in urban labor markets. Moreover, Güner and Uysal (2014) find that 
female migrants from provinces with a higher share of National Salvation Party  (MSP) vote in 
1973—a party later closed down on anti-secularism charges—have lower likelihood to participate 
in labor market in 2008.  
Figure 1 based on our data also shows that the employment to population ratio in urban 
areas are lower for pious Sunni women compared to the secular others. For cohorts between 1963 
and 1995, the average difference for pious Sunni and other women’s employment to population 
 
4 It is therefore common knowledge that someone called Mervan, Yavuz or Bekir is most likely a Sunni whereas a 
Zeynel Abidin or Naki would almost certainly be Alevi (Uysal, 2012).  
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ratio is 17.4 percentage points, although the gap diminishes for younger cohorts. On the other hand, 
a similar gap does not exist between pious Sunni and other men. Indeed, the employment to 
population ratio in 1963-1995 cohorts is 4.9 percentage points higher for pious Sunni (81.8% for 
Sunni Pious, and 76.4% for other men).   
 
Figure 1: Employment to population ratio by birth year (1963-1995) for pious Sunnis and 
others (seculars) in the urban areas 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on Konda Barometre Surveys, 2012-18 
 
The headscarf bans in public employment and universities were also important 
impediments that restricted pious Sunni women’s employment. According to a report by AK-DER, 
5,000 headscarved women were expelled and 10,000 headscarved women were forced to resign 
from public institutions between 1998 and 2002 for not following the dress code (cited in 
Cindoğlu, 2011). However, based on her interviews, Cindoğlu (2011) reports that discrimination 
against headscarved women also exists in the private sector and even in enterprises owned by pious 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, headscarved women were mainly employed in small-scale enterprises 
owned by pious entrepreneurs and were unable to find jobs in major private companies. Moreover, 
















































































































allowed them to provide worse working conditions and pay lower salaries to headscarved women. 
Similarly, Uğur (2017) finds that wearing headscarf significantly reduced women’s probability of 
employment in the 2000s even when controlled for education and religious practice, in both public 
and private sectors. The negative effects of headscarf were larger for women with tertiary degrees. 
The AKP government lifted the ban on headscarf in universities in 2010, for civil servants 
in 2013, for policewomen in 2017 and finally for army officers in 2019 (Çörekçioğlu, 2021). 
Çörekçioğlu empirically estimates that following the lift of the headscarf bans, female employment 
significantly improved specifically in municipalities with AKP mayors. 
While the headscarf is the most visible identity marker around which policies of negative 
and positive discrimination can be built, there is a greater policy environment that may facilitate 
the (re)distribution of resources among identity groups. As a non-resource-based country, 
discretionary channels of distribution are limited in Turkey, but as we will see that they are not 
inexistent.  
 
3.3.  Policy Tools 
AKP government implemented various policies that would support the growth of 
enterprises owned by the pious Sunni population or located in areas with larger shares of pious 
Sunni population, presumably generating job opportunities for the in -group through the 
employment of like-minded people. Chief among the policy tools available to the AKP 
government is the abuse of public procurement contracts to create and sustain a loyal business 
clientele. Examining a dataset of 49,355 high-value procurements during 2004-2011 Çeviker 
Gürakar (2016) finds that politically connected firms win the majority of the procurement contracts 
awarded through less competitive tender procedures. Since the share of public procurement is 
about 8.5% of Turkey’s GDP, favoritism exercised in this way could have substantial inter-group 
redistributive effects through firm activity. Another channel is politically motivated lending by 
public banks. Bircan and Saka (2021) find that there is greater state bank lending in provinces with 
an incumbent mayor aligned with the AKP. Moreover, political lending affects economic activity 
in non-aligned provinces significantly negatively. These findings suggest that provinces with a 
larger share of opposition voters, where pious people are disproportionately few, may be suffering 
economic setback due to politically motivated redistribution. 
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Allocation of public investments provides another channel. Examining data for public fixed 
capital investments in 2005-2012, which stands for roughly 5 percent of Turkey’s GDP, Luca and 
Rodriguez (2015) find that while socioeconomic factors remained the most relevant predictors of 
investment, the government also channeled public expenditures to reward its core constituencies. 
Marschall et al. (2015) finds that the government-run public housing agency TOKİ’s activity—
both in terms of expenditures and number of units built–was concentrated in provinces with AKP 
mayors. This not only means a greater provision of subsidized public housing in provinces with 
more pious individuals, but also generates potentially more construction contracts for politically 
affiliated firms and construction jobs for party supporters. 
AKP’s trade policies favoring trade with Muslim-majority countries is another channel that 
pushed the growth of enterprises owned by pious Sunnis. The average share of exports to 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, Iraq excluded) countries in Turkey’s total exports 
significantly increased from %15.2 in 1998-2002 to %18.3 in 2003-2010, and to 23.5% in 2011-
2019.5 Lo Turco and Maggioni (2018) note that between 2003 and 2009 AKP government signed 
10 trade agreements mostly with Muslim countries. They estimate that the firms in the regions 
with greater share of MÜSİAD (a business organization promoting capitalism with Islamic values) 
membership were more likely to enter export markets with new regional trade agreements and 
regional trade agreements with Muslim countries. Moreover, in the same period, firms from 
provinces with larger share of religious population were more likely to export p roducts to 
destinations with greater Muslim population. 
Policies like public contracts, regional trade agreements and bank credits mostly concern 
the transfer of wealth among business groups. While this kind of wealth transfer may trickle down 
to the general population groups, more directly relevant policies to the latter exist. Chief among 
these is the hiring practices in the public sector. As noted, when AKP allowed women to wear 
headscarves in public employment in 2013 this opened up a part of the labor market that has better 
pay and job security than the average job. In addition, discretionary hiring in favor of AKP 
supporters is another mechanism that may change the composition of public employment in favor 
of pious Sunnis.  
 
5 Authors’ calculations based on Turkstat (2021). Data on Iraq is excluded due to missing data for 1999-2002. The 
average share of exports to OIC countries, including Iraq, in Turkey’s total exports also increased from %17.8 in 1996-
1998 to %21.7 in 2003-2010, and to 29.5% in 2011-2019. 
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In Turkey, most civil servants are recruited through the centrally administered Public 
Servant Selection Exam (KPSS). Still, there are mechanisms to allow for favoritism in recruitment. 
First, KPSS and other public examinations conducted between 2010 and 2014 might not be entirely 
fair. There are ongoing criminal investigations on exams conducted by Student Measuring, 
Selection and Placement Center (ÖSYM) between 2010 and 2014 including KPSS, exams for 
police and military schools, and exams for recruitments of petty officers, judges and prosecutors 
(Tahincioğlu, 2021b). Former head of the ÖSYM Ali Demir and a number of ÖSYM member are 
accused of leaking exam questions and answers to the persons affiliated with the religious Gülen 
Cult that had strong ties with AKP government and was very influential in the government 
bureaucracy until at least 2013 (Tahincioğlu, 2021a). Although there was a purge of suspected 
Gulenists from the bureaucracy following the July 2016 coup attempt, those who had earlier 
switched their allegation from the cult to the party likely kept their jobs.6  
Second, a portion of the recruitments in public jobs also require interviews. These 
recruitments include positions in the Treasury, Foreign Affairs, academia, military and police 
departments. Moreover, interviews are also used for recruitment of teachers in temporary 
positions. Anectodical evidence reflects that many secular candidates who received significantly 
high scores in KPSS and other public examinations were eliminated in the interviews.7  
Third, mayors have significant control over recruitment of municipal employees 
(Çörekçioğlu, 2021). Indeed, Meşe (2011) reports that particularly during the pre-election periods 
municipalities are used for creating employment opportunities for potential voters. Fourth, 
disproportionate expansion of such public employment positions as imams and religious education 
teachers has changed the composition of public sector in favor of pious Sunni preferences (See 
Appendix C for detailed discussion). 
Lastly, during AKP’s term in office both the central government and the municipalities 
have developed various tools to distribute social assistance, most of which involve discretionary 
selection of recipients. There is some evidence for politically motivated selection even for the more  
rule-based conditional cash transfer program (Aytaç, 2014). In short, through public sector jobs, 
 
6 Following the military coup attempt in 2016, Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım said that “those who did not deliberately 
support this organization after December 17 [2013, the date of the first significant fallout between the Gulen movement 
and AKP] should not worry… However, there are no excuses after December 17” (Diken, 16 August 2016).   




private sector cronyism, and politically motivated social assistance, the AKP government could 
affect the occupational and income status of pious Sunni individuals. In this study we examine to 
what extent this was realized, judging from data on comprehensive employment and income 
outcomes.  
 
4. Data and Econometric Framework  
4.1. Data Source 
We use the monthly ‘Barometre’ survey by KONDA, an ongoing survey program with a 
known track record.8 The primary purpose of the survey is to track political opinions. Nevertheless, 
the survey also generates many demographic variables, including occupation and income as well 
as ethnicity and religiosity, which are not available in the official statistics. KONDA follows a 
stratified sampling method with neighborhoods / villages as ultimate sampling units (one adult 
from each household is surveyed). They also employ quotas for age.  
Barometre data set does not include a weighting variable. Therefore, we construct our own 
post-stratification weights by first creating 84 sub-groups for each year (7 regions * 2 gender * 3 
age * 2 education) using population of equivalent sub-groups from TURKSTAT Address-Based 
Population databank.9 By dividing the official population of each sub-group to number of 
observations in the same sub-group we obtained population weights (see Appendix A for details).  
 
4.1.1. Dependent Variables  
Employment in public sector is the primary dependent variable. We classify respondents 
choosing the “public servant, supervisor, manager” category10 as public sector employees. In 
Turkey, there are millions of temporary personnel working side by side with tenured civil servants 
in government offices and hundreds of thousands of blue-collar workers employed by municipal 
 
8 Barometre survey has been previously utilized as a data source by Altındağ and Kaishal (2020), Yagci and Oyvat 
(2020), Yörük (2012), Tezcür and Gurses (2017) among others. Barometre survey is conducted 11 months a year 
(either July, August or September is skipped), except 2015 when there were two general elections. As a result, 2015 
has significantly more observations than other years. 
9 TURKSTAT data from https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=tr. Regions refer to the seven geographical 
regions of Turkey, education distinguishes between those with less than high school education vs high school 
graduates, and age groups are 18-29, 30-44, 45+. Our aim was to create cells with at least 30 observations. In the end, 
number of observations in cells ranged between 22 and 1080 with only one cell with less than 30 observations. Median 
cell has 327 observations. The smallest cell is Eastern women aged 45+ with high school or more education from 
2012. 
10 “Devlet memuru, şef, müdür vb” in Turkish. 
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governments; who are officially not civil servants and are not part of the public sector retirement 
fund. It is not obvious which occupational category these individuals report among the available 
options in the survey. To shed light on this, we compare our population -weighted estimates of 
public sector employees to official figures from administrative data in Table A2. Barometre 
estimates are strikingly close to official civil servant numbers and substantially below the total 
public sector employment figure. We believe that Barometre surveys really report civil servants 
with full rights (good pension, very secure employment etc.) as public sector employment.  
We also investigate placement in alternative definitions of employment. We combined 
“manager and clerk in the private sector,” “merchant, industrialist, businessman” and “self -
employed professional (doctors, architects, lawyers etc.)” to create a private high -status jobs 
category. We also combine these private high-status jobs with public sector employment to 
generate overall high-status employment. Lastly, we investigate determinants of all employment 
(any job) and urban employment, which excludes people living in rural areas.     
 
4.1.2. Explanatory Variables  
We split the sample to those born between 1963 and 1980 and those born between 1981 
and 1995.11 The survey participants born between 1981 and 1995 very likely entered the labor 
market for high status jobs (public or private) during the AKP rule (November 2002 and present).  
It is likely that the survey participants born between 1963 and 1980 entered the labor market for 
high status jobs before AKP rule. We perform our employment analysis for prime working-age 
adults between 23 and 49 in order to i) create roughly equal number of years around 1980, ii) 
exclude the undergraduate students, iii) minimize the effect of the early retirement scheme that 
was in effect between 1992 and 1999 and which allowed some women and men to retire at 38 and 
44, respectively.12  
Our main explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent 
belongs to the pious Sunni social group. We construct membership in this group by taking those 
who answer a survey question about religious affiliation as Sunni Muslim (92% of our 23-49 aged 
 
11 Those born in 1963 are 49 years old in 2012 survey and are the oldest in the sample and those born in 1995 are 23 
years old in 2018 survey and are the youngest in the survey. See Figure A1 for birth year distribution of 
observations. 
12 Aşık (2018) shows that in 2012 labor force participation of both men and women above the age of 50 were lower 
than their level in 1990s. Actually labor force participation of women aged 40-49 declined between 1995 and 2004 
but by 2012 was above 1990s level.  
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respondents), and among these keeping only those who answer a question abou t religiosity with 
the top 2 among 5 ordinal levels of religiosity. These operations generate membership in the 
hypothesized public policy in-group, which we call as pious Sunnis, and the secular out-group 
comprises the rest. Across our survey years 2012-2018, the share of pious Sunnis in the sample 
varies between 65-70 % of the sample. In addition, we also examine whether those who identify 
as Kurdish (or Zaza) in response to a question about ethnicity—regardless of their religious-
sectarian affiliation—experience separate trends. 
 
4.1.3. Control Variables  
We control for survey regions (12 NUTS1 regions). We also control for the interaction of 
survey year and geographical region since private sector employment is sensitive to 
macroeconomic fluctuations.13 In addition to limiting the sample to 23–49-year-olds we also 
control for birth year. We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high 
school and tertiary graduates) in every specification, especially because passing a  competitive 
centrally administered exam (KPSS) is a pre-requisite for civil service employment and most 
positions in civil service also requires a tertiary degree (two- or four-years).14 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. For the overall population, from the older to the 
younger cohort the share of those with tertiary degrees increased from 12.6 to 24.6 percent, a 95 
percent increase, whereas high-status employment only increased by two percentage points (from 
18.2 to 20.4). For those born after 1980 competition is much fiercer for high-status jobs, all of 
which now basically require a tertiary degree. Women’s share in tertiary degrees increased faster 
than men in both absolute and relative terms. While the increase is larger for women for all 
employment categories too, the share of men employed is still larger (see Appendix B for trends 
in share of tertiary degrees by gender and religiosity). 
 
13 We group NUTS1 regions into five broad regions: West (TR1-TR4), South (TR6), Central (TR5 & TR7), North 
(TR8 & TR9), and East (TR10-TR12) following Turkish Demographic and Health Survey. 




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of survey respondents age between 23 & 49 
 Whole sample Men Women 



















tertiary degree 110,115 0.126 0.246 95% 54,025 0.158 0.267 69% 56,090 0.096 0.225 136% 
public employment 110,115 0.071 0.067 -6% 54,025 0.103 0.077 -25% 56,090 0.040 0.056 39% 
high status jobs, private 110,115 0.111 0.138 24% 54,025 0.172 0.186 8% 56,090 0.054 0.090 68% 
high status jobs, total 110,115 0.182 0.204 12% 54,025 0.275 0.264 -4% 56,090 0.094 0.147 56% 
employed, urban 88,963 0.553 0.550 -1% 42,919 0.910 0.822 -10% 46,044 0.234 0.292 25% 
employed, total 110,115 0.543 0.538 -1% 54,025 0.896 0.812 -9% 56,090 0.215 0.271 26% 
hh pc income adjusted 78,230 2,273 2,432 7% 38,543 2,399 2,593 8% 39,687 2,154 2,274 6% 
 Pious Sunnis 
tertiary degree 73,265 0.094 0.189 100% 33,428 0.133 0.229 72% 39,837 0.062 0.155 148% 
public employment 73,265 0.059 0.057 -3% 33,428 0.099 0.078 -22% 39,837 0.026 0.040 52% 
high status jobs, private 73,265 0.089 0.111 25% 33,428 0.154 0.174 13% 39,837 0.035 0.057 61% 
high status jobs, total 73,265 0.148 0.168 13% 33,428 0.253 0.252 0% 39,837 0.061 0.097 57% 
employed, urban 58,124 0.504 0.507 1% 26,081 0.908 0.850 -6% 32,043 0.180 0.220 23% 
employed, total 73,265 0.496 0.496 0% 33,428 0.893 0.837 -6% 39,837 0.166 0.204 22% 
hh pc income adjusted 52,138 2,115 2,174 3% 23,909 2,257 2,367 5% 28,229 1,995 2,007 1% 
 Others 
tertiary degree 36,850 0.201 0.342 71% 20,597 0.209 0.322 54% 16,253 0.191 0.367 92% 
public employment 36,850 0.097 0.082 -15% 20,597 0.111 0.077 -30% 16,253 0.081 0.089 10% 
high status jobs, private 36,850 0.163 0.183 12% 20,597 0.209 0.203 -3% 16,253 0.107 0.158 47% 
high status jobs, total 36,850 0.260 0.265 2% 20,597 0.320 0.280 -12% 16,253 0.188 0.247 31% 
employed, urban 30,839 0.663 0.618 -7% 16,838 0.914 0.784 -14% 14,001 0.379 0.428 13% 
employed, total 36,850 0.654 0.608 -7% 20,597 0.903 0.776 -14% 16,253 0.353 0.406 15% 
hh pc income adjusted 26,092 2,653 2,867 8% 14,634 2,684 2,913 9% 11,458 2,615 2,810 7% 
Notes: hh: household. Population weights are applied. All the reported employment statistics are employment-to-population ratios. Most of the missing data (7,097 
out of 10,108) are from August 2016, March, April and May 2017 surveys when religion question is not asked. There are also fewer observations for income 
variable because of missing household size data from earlier surveys. We also had to exclude roughly 5,500 observations from 2013 because they lacked information 
on province of residence. We use province of residence to cluster standard errors in regression analys
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Next we compare the change in employment for sub-categories. Comparing the change 
between two periods for each group provides us with a rough difference-in-differences estimate in 
descriptive statistics. We observe that the pious Sunni group experienced the greatest employment 
gains. For example, total high-status employment has increased from 14.8 to 16.8 percent for pious 
Sunni individuals born after 1980, and from 26.0 to 26.5 percent for the others. Hence, high-status 
employment for pious Sunni individuals increased by 1.5 percentage points more compare to the 
secular group between the two periods. All the increase in high-status employment is due to overall 
increase in private high-status jobs, since Turkey has been experiencing a trend of relative 
shrinking of public sector during the period under investigation. However, pious Sunni individuals 
experienced only a slight decline in public sector employment. 
Investigating the change between two periods by gender reveals different patterns by 
employment categories. The declining share of public sector employment is solely due to men. 
Public sector employment increased by 2.4 percentage points for pious Sunni women, and 0.8 
percentage points for secular women. Pious Sunni men and secular women also experienced 
significant employment gains in private high-status employment. secular men did not experience 
any increase in high-status employment. Despite the gains made by women born after 1980, men 
are still much more likely to be employed in general, and also to be employed in high status jobs. 
Finally, household per capita incomes rose less for pious Sunni individuals compared to 
the rest, somewhat contrary to employment findings. As we discuss later,  pious Sunni individuals’ 
gains in high-status employment is not reflected in household incomes probably because dual-
earner and smaller households are more common among the rest.      
 
4.3. Econometric Framework 
We present two alternative econometric approaches in empirical analysis that complement 
each other. First, a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach allows us to estimate the overall 
impact of being a pious Sunni. Secondly, we make use of a quasi-event study approach; where the 
functional form and periodization is more flexible, i.e. before and after is not imposed by the 
researcher. The event study plot also allows us to visually verify a parallel trend assumption in the 
1963-1980 period. We estimate all regressions separately for men and women due to very large 




Figure 2: Ratio of Public Sector Workers by Religiosity  
Panel A: Women born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 
Panel B: Men born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 




4.3.1. Difference-in-differences (DiD) Approach 
Figure 2 shows that public sector employment-to-population ratios are not substantially 
different for those born in the late 1970s and early 1980s for either identity group. However, public 
sector employment-to-population trajectories of other sub-group differs substantially from Sunni 
religious sub-group by 1990s. In order to account for this specific trajectory, we estimate the 
following model: 
  𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑌81−89 × 𝑃𝑆𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑌90−95 × 𝑃𝑆𝑖) + Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒(𝑖) 
Here Empi indicates whether person i is employed / urban employed / public sector 
employed / private high status employed. BY81-89 is an indicator for individual i born between 1981 
and 1989; BY90-95 is an indicator for individual i born between 1990 and 1995; PSi is an indicator 
for whether person is a pious Sunni or not15; Xi is a vector of controls: pious Sunni or not, cohort 
(1981-89 or1990-95), birth year, education level (less than high school, high school, tertiary), 
NUTS1 survey region, and interaction of f ive broad regions and survey year. 
 
4.3.2. Quasi-event-study Approach 
The DiD framework imposes a strict periodization as before and after. As we discuss in the 
next section, this clear-cut periodization may not be valid for our case since those born in the late 
1970s may also enter the labor force during AKP rule, although in smaller ratios. Moreover, in the 
DiD approach we impose a functional form. An event-study approach allows us to relax these 
constraints. Additionally, younger cohorts may change their schooling behavior by studying longer 
(for example to obtain a master degree) in response to evolving job market conditions. This issue 
is most salient to cohorts born after 1992 in our dataset (see Figure 1). In the event-study approach, 
treatment and control group members from each age are compared separately, hence we can 
directly observe if the overall estimates are driven by these youngest cohorts (see Figures 3 and 
4). Moreover, Figure 2 shows that parallel trends assumption does not hold in the pre -treatment 
period in the raw data (hence the controls). In Figures 3 and 4, we visually document that after 
controlling for confounders, pre-treatment period trends are not significantly different than each 
other. In this approach we estimate the following regression:   
 
15 We also estimate this regression by leaving out Kurds for robustness. Please see Appendix D. 
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𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽
𝜏 (𝐵𝑌𝑖 × 𝑃𝑆𝑖)
1995
𝜏=1963
+ Γ𝑋𝑖 + 𝑒(𝑖) 
Here Empi indicates whether person i is employed / urban employed / public-sector employed / 
private high-status employed. BYi is an indicator for birth year of individual i; PSi is an indicator 
for whether person is a pious Sunni or not; Xi is a vector of controls (same as above except birth 
cohorts). We plot coefficients 𝛽𝜏, normalizing 𝛽1969 as zero, since it is the first birth year with 
observations from each survey year, to trace out the changes in employment for those born between 
1963 and 1995. We employ population weights described above, and we cluster standard errors by 
survey province.        
 
4.3.3. Estimation Issues 
There are three potential issues for our estimation strategy. The first one is identification. 
Our data is from 2012-2018 period, i.e. AKP period, we do not have actual observations from pre-
AKP period to observe the distributions of high status jobs (public or private). Most of the 23-49 
year olds in the Barometre surveys entered the labor market long before the survey date. We 
observe their religious identity on the day of survey but we do not know how they identified when 
they started the job. For example, person A who is born in 1984 and entered the public service in 
2007, could have identified herself as a secular in 2007. However, the same person could have 
identified herself as pious, when she was surveyed in 2015. In our estimations, we classify her as 
a pious person who entered employment in AKP period, hence we may over-estimate16 the AKP 
effect if such people are a significant part of the population. We have supporting evidence to 
suggest that this is not a large problem: i) The share of pious Sunni group is roughly stable over 
the survey years (see Table B1). ii) If anything the share of pious Sunni are declining among the 
youngest cohorts (born after mid-1980s, see Figure A1 bottom panel).17 We expect this to be a 
more stable identity compare to others, such as being AKP voter or wearing headscarf are much 
more likely to be endogenous to employment status.  
 
16 A public sector employee who was not pious on the day of employment is counted as pious due to her self -
identification on the day of survey. 
17 We run an experiment assuming that 10 percent of sample were not pious Sunni when they entered the public sector 
employment. We find that pious Sunni coefficient approaches zero. However, the main variables of interest, 
interaction terms, do not change much. Results are available upon request.  
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Another potential estimation issue is that we do not know when people started working in 
the job they report for the survey. We classify observations to pre-treatment versus treatment 
period by birth year. In the DiD approach, we classify observations born between 1963 and 1980 
as pre-treatment and observations born in 1981-1995 as treatment period. For example, if person 
A, who is born in 1978 and became public servant in 2007 (surveyed in 2014) is a secular, we 
misclassify her a member of the control group in the pre-treatment period when in reality she 
started working in the public sector in treatment period. This misclassification creates a fictitious 
decline in control group public sector employment and lead to over-estimation of AKP effects. If 
she is a religious person, we misclassify a member of treatment group in the pre-treatment period 
when in reality she started working in the public sector in treatment period. This misclassification 
creates a fictitious decline in treatment group public sector employment and lead to under-
estimation of AKP effects.18 Pious Sunnis constitute roughly two-thirds of the 23-49 years olds in 
our sample, second misclassification is the most likely case, hence we are probably under-
estimating AKP effects. In other words, our regression estimates should be regarded as lower 
bound estimates. Also, in event-study design we relax the strict periodization imposed in DiD 
framework and get around these problems. 
Finally, we may have an endogeneity problem, i.e. people working in the public sector or 
private high status jobs may feel pressured to declare to be pious Sunnis when they are not. 
However, the reverse causality problem would lead to a bias in our estimations only if the rates of 
false declaration are different across cohorts. In order to address this reverse causality problem, 
we also estimate instrumental variable (IV) regressions where we instrument pious Sunni identity 
with the share of pious Sunnis in the province of birth and the interaction of share of pious Sunnis 
in the province of birth with born in 1981-89 variable and the interaction of share of pious Sunnis 






18 We run another experiment assuming 10 percent of sample born in 1976-1980 entering labor force after 2003. We 
find that interaction terms hardly change. Only the coefficient of born between 1980-89 approaches zero. Note that a  
reverse scenario (a person born in 1982 (classified as treatment period) but entered public sector employment before 




Table 2: Determinants of public sector and private high-status jobs in Turkey (2012-2018) 
  Public sector employment Private high status jobs 
  Age 23-49, All Age 23-49, All 
 Total Men Women Total Men Women 
Pious Sunni -0.003 0.011** -0.018*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.033*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Born in 1981-89  -0.072*** -0.102*** -0.043*** 0.004 0.004 0.010 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
Pious Sunni* Born in 1981-
89 
0.016*** 0.013** 0.013** -0.003 0.011 -0.017** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Born in 1990-95 -0.133*** -0.155*** -0.111*** -0.070*** -0.086*** -0.041** 
(0.016) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.018) 
Pious Sunni*Born in 1990-
95 
0.039*** 0.020** 0.054*** 0.029*** 0.055*** -0.007 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Middle school degree 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.010*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
High school degree 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.036*** 0.071*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Tertiary degree 0.286*** 0.303*** 0.266*** 0.228*** 0.225*** 0.232*** 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) 
Kurd -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.013* -0.021* -0.005 











Adj. R-Square 0.171 0.160 0.186 0.116 0.080 0.132 
Sample Size 110,115 54,025 56,090 110,115 54,025 56,090 
Birth year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1 regions fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 regions * survey year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard Errors are clustered at province level. Population weights are applied.  ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: 
p<0.10. 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
5.1. Main findings 
 
Table 2 shows the determinants of public sector employment and private high -status jobs in 
Turkey. For public sector employment, we find that the impact of being pious Sunni (PS) is 
insignificant for the whole sample, is positive at 5% for men and is negative at 1% for women with 
a coefficient of -0.018, meaning that pious Sunni women are estimated to suffer from about a 1.8 
percentage points-gap in public sector employment compared to other women on average, without 
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yet distinguishing between cohorts. The negative sign of PS for women could be an outcome of 
the negative role of religious conservatism on women’s labor force participation (Dildar, 2015) 
and may also the reflect the effect of headscarf bans that continued in state institutions until 2013.  
The positive sign of PS for men reflects that pre-1981 male PS cohorts were already slightly 
advantageous (when controlled for education level, in which pious Sunni people are at a 
disadvantage) for being recruited by the public institutions. Strikingly, however, the PS interaction 
terms for 1981-89 and 1990-95 are positive at 5% significance level; which reflects that PS men 
that probably entered the job market during AKP era are more likely to be recruited in the public 
institutions. For women, Table 2 shows that the impediment for being PS is significantly reduced 
for the 1980s cohort and entirely reversed for the 1990s cohort as the coefficient of PSxB90-95 is 
0.054 as opposed to SP’s coefficient, -0.018. The coefficient for PSxB90-95 likely reflects the 
influence of the end of the headscarf ban in public institutions in 2013 and maybe the beginning 
of negative discrimination against secular women for recruitments in the public sector. 
Figure 3 shows estimates that include PS’s yearly interaction terms.19 For estimations of 
public sector employment, the coefficients for the interaction terms for men are close to zero for 
the 1970s generation and it becomes significantly positive for the 1981 cohort, which was at the 
age of 22 and therefore the earliest cohort to mostly receive tertiary degrees during the first full 
year of the AKP government. This also shows that the younger PS men that entered the job market 
during the AKP era have greater likelihood of being employed in the public sector compared to 
earlier generations. Similarly, for public sector employment of women, PSxByear interaction 
terms are mainly positive for 1980s, the coefficients become significant at 5% for PSxB1988 are 
increasingly larger for post-1988 generation reflecting the influence of the end of headscarf ban in 
the public sector. Moreover, other women might be increasingly less preferred in public 
institutions during the AKP era.  
Turning now to the private sector, according to Table 2, women in general and PS women 
in particular were less likely to be working in the private high-status jobs. For men, PSxB90-95 
interaction term is significantly positive. For women, PSxB81-89 and PSxB90-95 interaction 
terms are negative and at 5% significant for PSxB90-95. The growing job opportunities in the 
 
19 We choose the base cohort in Figure 3 as 1969, which is the eldest cohort in our sample 2018, members of whom 
therefore appear in all survey years. Older cohorts are missing in some survey years and their inclusion therefore 
introduces estimation inefficiency. 
25 
 
public sector might be pulling the high-skilled PS women to the public sector from the private 
sector. It might also be the case that secular women that are less likely to be employed in the public 
sector during the AKP era are being pushed to the private sector, i.e. crowded-out from the public 
sector by pious Sunnis. Similarly, Figure 3 shows that starting from the 1988 cohort the PS men 
are increasingly gaining advantage against seculars in terms of employment in private high-status 
jobs. A similar trend is not observed for PS women possibly due to the pull effect of growing job 
opportunities in the public sector. Lastly, Table 2 shows that being Kurd, at 10%, significantly 
reduced men’s probability of being employed in private high-status jobs on average, independently 
of cohorts. 
 
Figure 3: Coefficient Plot of pious Sunni and birth-year interaction variables for Public 
Sector and High-Status Private Sector Jobs (23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 
Notes: The base year is 1969. Vertical axis shows the results of interaction between pious-Sunni dummy and birth 
year. We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), Kurd 
dummy, NUTS1 regions and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. Standard Errors are clustered at 
province level. Population weights are applied. The lines show confidence intervals at 5%. Population weights and 




Next, we estimate the influence of being PS on high-status jobs (public sector plus private 
high-status jobs), urban employment and employment in general. Overall, Table 3 shows that pre-
1981 PS women cohorts are significantly (at 1%) less likely to be employed in all these categories. 
This is consistent with the previous studies indicating that patriarchal norms and religiosity are 
negatively associated with women’s labor participation in Turkey (Dildar, 2015). Moreover, pre-
1981 PS male cohorts are less likely to get employed in high-status jobs overall. The coefficients 
for PSxB81-89 and PSxB90-95 interaction terms show that PS cohorts, who are more likely to 
enter the job market during Erdoğan era, have greater opportunities of being employed in all jobs, 
urban jobs and high-status jobs compared to older PS cohorts.  
 
Table 3: Determinants of employment, urban employment and high-status employment in 
Turkey (2012-2018) 
 All employment All employment High status employment 
 Age 23-49, All Age 23-49, urban Age 23-49, All 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Pious Sunni -0.003 -0.095*** -0.001 -0.104*** -0.020*** -0.051*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) 
Born in 1981-90 -0.004 -0.005 0.037 -0.003 -0.101*** -0.033** 
  (0.045) (0.029) (0.054) (0.025) (0.024) (0.015) 
Pious Sunni * born in 
1981-90 
0.036*** -0.008 0.036*** -0.005 0.025*** -0.004 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) 
Born in 1991-95 
  
-0.263*** -0.184*** -0.241*** -0.182*** -0.244*** -0.152*** 
(0.057) (0.033) (0.067) (0.027) (0.030) (0.024) 
Pious Sunni* born in 
1991-95 
0.114*** 0.073*** 0.111*** 0.088*** 0.077*** 0.046*** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
Middle school degree 0.058*** 0.040*** 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
High school degree 0.022*** 0.141*** 0.017*** 0.145*** 0.158*** 0.096*** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Tertiary degree 0.019** 0.503*** 0.022*** 0.515*** 0.529*** 0.500*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) 
Kurd -0.027*** -0.019** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.002 
  (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) 
Adj. R-Square 0.078 0.214 0.092 0.223 0.214 0.307 
Sample Size  54,025   56,090   42,919   46,044   54,025   56,090  
Birth Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1 regions fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 regions * survey 
year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




For women, the gap between PS and others is not closed for the 1981-90 generation for 
any of the categories; however, it’s significantly narrowed down for 1990s generation. Moreover, 
Table 3 shows that Kurdish men are significantly less likely to find jobs in whole sample, urban 
sample and high-status jobs and Kurdish women are less likely to find jobs in whole sample and 
urban sample.  
Figure 4 shows that the post-1987 PS men cohorts are getting increasingly likely to be 
employed in urban and high-status jobs compared to older PS male cohorts. Moreover, the 
coefficients for PSxB93-95 show that the job opportunities for 1993-95 PS female cohorts 
improved.  
 
Figure 4: The relative probability of employment in urban and high-status jobs of pious 
Sunni individuals compared to the 1969 cohort (year effect, 2012-2018) 
 
Notes: The base year is 1969. Vertical axis shows the results of interaction between the pious-Sunni dummy and birth 
year. We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), Kurd 
dummy, NUTS1 regions and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. Standard Errors are clustered at 
province level. Population weights are applied. The lines show confidence intervals at 5%. Population weights and 




Next, Table 4 shows the determinants of being in top income levels in Turkey. For pre -
1981 cohorts, PS individuals were less likely to be in top 1%, top 5%, top 10% and top 20% income 
groups20. However, SPxB90-95 coefficient is significantly (respectively at 0.05 and 0.1 levels) 
positive for top 1% and top 5% groups, which indicates that the gap between PS and others in 




Table 4: Determinants of being in top income groups in Turkey (2013-2018) 
  top 1 % top 5 % top 10 % top 20 % 
Pious Sunni -0.007*** -0.021*** -0.037*** -0.051*** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Born in 1981-89 0.000 0.001 -0.040*** -0.053** 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) 
Pious Sunni * born in 1981-89 -0.001 -0.010** -0.011* -0.013* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Born in 1990-95 0.001 -0.005 -0.039 -0.047 
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030) 
Pious Sunni * born in 1990-95 0.007** 0.011* 0.010 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Middle school degree 0.001* 0.009*** 0.021*** 0.051*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) 
High school degree 0.002 0.025*** 0.058*** 0.146*** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015) 
Tertiary degree 0.032*** 0.166*** 0.284*** 0.445*** 
  (0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) 
Kurd -0.003** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.036*** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
Women -0.003*** -0.010** -0.012* -0.011 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
Adj. R-Square 0.020 0.092 0.143 0.195 
Sample Size  70,460   70,460   70,460   70,460  
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1 regions fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 regions * survey year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 




20 To find individuals at top income groups, we ranked individuals’ incomes for each year using “square root scale” 
adjustment. Hence, income for each individual is 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒/√𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠. 
Estimations are for 2013-2018, since data on the number of household members is not available for 2012.  
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 Finally, Figure 5 reflects the economic significance of our estimations in Table 2 and 3 by 
showing the likelihood of pious Sunnis being employed in all job categories, compared to seculars. 
The bars for 1963-80 are the coefficients for PS from Table 2 and Table 3 divided by the overall 
share of the population for 1963-80 cohorts (according to our sample) in each occupation category. 
This shows the pre-1981 PS cohorts’ likelihood of employment compared to other cohorts born 
before 1981. The bars for 1981-89 (1990-95) are the sums of coefficients for PS and PSxB81-
89(90-95) interaction term divided by the share of population for 1981-89(1990-95) cohorts in 
each occupation category. Following Ziliak and McCloskey (2004, 2008), we do not treat the 
coefficients that are not significant at 10% as zero and discuss the economic significance of the 
non-significant coefficients along with the coefficients that are significant at 10%. 
According to Figure 5, the most noticeable improvement is observed in public sector jobs 
for PS women. PS women born before 1981 are 37.1% less likely to be employed in public sector 
jobs compared to other women, whereas PS women born in 1981-89 and 1990-95 are respectively 
10.1% less likely and 74.1% more likely to be employed than other women born in 1981-89 and 
1990-95. Moreover, PS men born before 1981 are 12.2% more likely to be employed in public 
sector jobs than their other counterparts, which improved to 26.6% for PS men born in 1981-89 
and to 33.8% for men born in 1990s. All these effects are estimated by controlling for the education 
level of the respondents. Without controlling for education, the gradual improvement of PS 
individuals’ employment chances during AKP era look substantially greater for most job 
categories, since PS individuals also made progress in closing the education gap during the same 
era, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
SP men born before 1981 are 15.9% less likely to be employed in private high-status jobs 
than other men. The gap for PS men shrank for younger cohorts, such that PS men born in 1981-
89 are 9.7% less likely and PS men born in 1990s are 14.8% more likely to be employed than their 
comparative counterparts. Similarly, PS men born before 1981 are 0.1% less likely to be employed 
in urban jobs, whereas probabilities of being employed in urban jobs are 4.0% and 12.7% greater 
for PS men born in 1981-89 and 1990-95 respectively. The interaction terms for 1990-95 are larger 
than the interaction terms for 1981-89. This might reflect that as time passes under AKP 
governments, the economic activities of firms owned by PS could be progressively improving 





Figure 5: Pious Sunni cohorts’ probability of employment compared to rest (2012-2018) 
 
  
Note: The bars show the coefficients from Table 2 and Table 3 divided by the share of population (for relevant cohorts) 
in each types of jobs. 
 
 
On the other hand, PS women’s likelihood of being employed in private high -status jobs 
was 45.7% lower compared to their other counterparts. This gap further deteriorated for younger 
PS women. PS women born in 1981-89 are 68.9% and PS women born in 1990s are 55.5% less 
likely to be employed in private high-status jobs. The PS women’s likelihood to be employed in 
private high-status jobs could be an outcome of ongoing social constraints on PS women’s labor 


























































































participation. It could be also due to the substantial increase in PS women’s likelihood of being 
employed in public sector jobs, which may pull PS women from high skilled private to public jobs. 
On the other hand, we find that PS women’s probability of being employed in urban jobs is %39.7 
less for pre-1981 cohorts, which significantly improved for PS born in 1990-95. PS women born 
in 1990-95 are only 7.3% less likely to be employed in urban jobs than their other counterparts. 
 
5.2. Robustness analysis 
In this section, we conduct several robustness analyses. First, we present estimations by taking 
those who report the top level of religiosity in the survey’s 1 -5 ordinal scale, which we here call 
as Highly Religious Sunni (HRS) as a separate category from other pious Sunnis (OPS). This is 
therefore a group that shows the utmost religious tendencies. In our regression sample, HRS 
individuals constitute only 9.3% of population. There is greater support for the incumbent AKP 
government amongst the HRS. Between 2012-2018, 66.1-79.4% of HRS people reported an 
intention to vote for AKP (with average of 73.1%), whereas this ratio was 56.0 -70.3% (with 
average of 65.1%) among the rest of the PS.21 54.7% of the HRS group in our regression sample 
define their lifestyle as “Religious Conservative” as opposed to 30.1% of the other PS. Moreover, 
89.7% of Sunni Highly Religious women wear headscarf, whereas 75.0% of other PS women wear 
headscarf.  
Table 5 shows that, for public sector employment, the coefficients for HRSx1990-95 
interaction term are 1.5 percentage points higher for men and 2.6 percentage points higher for 
women compared to the coefficients for OPSx1990-95.22 Moreover, the coefficients for 
HRSx1981-89 are also larger than the coefficients for OPSx1981-89 for women and men. Hence, 
during the AKP era, it was not only the younger cohorts of PS people, who constitute a large part 
of the society that gained an advantage over others. A smaller and highly religious sub-group that 
constitutes a minority of Turkish society gained over everyone else, including the rest of the PS.  
For private high-status jobs, the coefficients for HRS and OPS are similarly negative. HRS 
men from the 1990s cohorts have significantly (at 1%) higher opportunities to be employed in 
 
21 We estimate the range for AKP votes by combining the monthly surveys for each year. Hence, the minimum and 
maximum values are values for years that AKP’s votes were at m inimum and maximum. AKP vote shares exclude 
the indecisive voters and those who declare that they will not vote. 
22 For public sector employment, the coefficients for SHRx1990-95 interaction terms are larger than the coefficients 
for OPSx1990-95 at 1% for women. 
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private high-status jobs compared to pre-1981 cohorts, and the positive coefficient for HRSx1990-
95 is 1.1 percentage point greater than OPSx1990-95. 
 
Table 5: Determinants of high-status employment of highly religious in Turkey (2012-2018)  
  Public Sector Employment High Status Jobs, Private  
  Age 23-49, everybody Age 23-49, everybody 
  
Men and 
Women Men Women 
Men and 
Women Men Women 
Highly religious and other pious Sunnis 
Other pious Sunni -0.003 0.010** -0.017*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Other pious Sunni * b. 
in 1981-89 
0.015*** 0.013** 0.012** -0.004 0.009 -0.017** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
Other pious Sunni * b. 
in 1990-95 
0.037*** 0.018** 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.055*** -0.009 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Highly religious Sunni  -0.004 0.016** -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Highly religious Sunni 
* born in 1981-89 
0.021*** 0.015* 0.017** 0.006 0.034** -0.018** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) 
Highly religious Sunni 
* born in 1990-95 
0.059*** 0.033** 0.076*** 0.035*** 0.066*** -0.004 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.011) 
Adj. R-Square 0.171 0.159 0.185 0.113 0.076 0.129 
Sample Size  110,115   54,025   56,090   110,115   54,025   56,090  
Birth Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1 regions fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 regions * survey 
year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), Kurd 
dummy, gender dummy when applicable, NUTS1 regions and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. 
Standard Errors are clustered at province level. Population weights are applied.  ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. 
 
 
Next, we would like to report analyses where we separate groups not on the basis of 
religious group membership but on the basis of whether they wear headscarves or not. Obviously 
this analysis can be done only for women, and it is known that many female civil servants put on 
their headscarves only once it was legally allowed. Headscarf is therefore partly endogenous to 
occupational status—more so than religious identities reported in our survey data—and for this 
reason we treat this as a secondary analysis. Our results in Appendix D Table D1 and Figure D1 
show results that are similar to our primary findings. Pre-1981 cohort women with headscarves 
were disadvantaged against other women, which is consistent with headscarf bans in public 
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institutions that continued until 2013. The disadvantage of headscarved women was reduced in 
1981-89 cohorts and turned into an advantage in the 1990s cohorts. Women with headscarves are 
less likely to be employed in high-status jobs in the private sector in pre-1981 cohorts. For high-
status jobs in the private sector, the coefficients for interaction terms are insignificant. Lifting the 
headscarf ban in public sector did not impact the situation of women with headscarves in private 
sector high-status jobs 
We also exclude Kurds from our estimations in Table 2 to examine whether any 
discrimination against the Kurdish population biased our estimations. The coefficient sizes and 
levels of significance in our estimations are very similar to Table 2, when Kurds are excluded from 
our sample. These results are also in Table D1. 
Last, Appendix E reproduces main findings for public sector and private high-status jobs 
with IV estimates. In IV estimates, coefficient estimates for interaction terms are larger in absolute 
terms suggesting that our OLS estimates should be regarded as lower-bound estimates. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we provide the first comprehensive individual-level empirical evidence of 
AKP’s rewarding its demographic in-group in the labor market, especially public sector 
employment. A growing literature shows that AKP channels public investment to its  electoral 
constituencies, awards public procurement contracts to like-minded business groups and direct 
public banks’ lending to generate electoral advantages for the party’s mayors. These channels are 
important for the allocation of wealth and power among business groups. However, a potentially 
larger group of people are affected by public sector recruitment. Moreover, public sector 
employment is one of the main means of social mobility in developing countries.  
Quantitative analysis of patronage in public sector employment is hampered by lack of 
adequate data in Turkey. We address this problem by utilizing private polling data with good track 
record. We pool surveys from 2012 to 2018 and identify pious Sunni individuals—AKP’s core 
social constituency—and examine whether their public employment ratio has changed under 
AKP’s term in office.  
We first confirm that across the entire pooled sample, secular people have higher ratios of 
university degree attainment, employment in the public sector and high-status private sector jobs 
as well as higher income. We find, however, that under AKP rule pious Sunnis (PS) displayed 
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significant improvement in occupational outcomes while seculars relatively declined, controlling 
for education—all the more striking because pious Sunnis have also moved to close the education 
gap. The most important changes concern women. While older cohorts of pious Sunni women 
have substantially lower likelihood to be employed in the public sector compared to secular 
women, this disadvantage disappears for younger cohorts, and turns into an advantage for the 
newest cohorts, who likely entered the job market after 2013 when the government lifted the ban 
on headscarves (a visible marker of Sunni piety among women) for civil servants. Moreover, under 
AKP rule, it might have become more difficult for secular women to be employed in the public 
institutions, as Çörekçioğlu (2021) reflects for AKP-run municipalities. 
Nonetheless, pious women are not displaying the same kind of improvement in their 
relative employment ratio in high-status private sector jobs, unlike pious Sunni men who are 
improving their share in both scores compared to their secular counterparts. The PS women’s 
growing opportunities of secure jobs with fixed work schedules in the public sector and the 
ongoing discrimination against PS women (Cindoğlu, 2011) in private sector as well as 
discrimination against secular women in the public sector could have contributed to this outcome.  
Furthermore, there is also evidence for some improvement in the household income 
hierarchy for the entire group. The growth of politically connected private firms (Çeviker Gürakar, 
2016; Bircan and Saka, 2021) and higher public investments in AKP’s core constituencies (Luca 
and Rodriguez, 2015) could have improved private job opportunities for pious Sunni men. 
Moreover, public institutions and private firms might have earlier faced a constraint in terms of 
number of skilled PS job candidates, which has perhaps been eased with the rising number of 
university graduates among this group during AKP’s term. 
Moreover, during AKP rule not only PS that constitute a larger share of population 
improved their likelihood of being employed in public jobs, but also a smaller group of highly 
religious Sunni men and women (which constitutes only 9.3% of population) improved their 
employment opportunities in public sector more than the rest of the SP.  
Our results strongly suggest as AKP rule solidified, its core constituencies became more 
likely to be employed in public sector and high-status private sector jobs compared to “secular” 
others. Our findings are in line with the emerging literature from Turkey about the way in which 
AKP is wielding its political power to reward its constituencies and reaping electoral rewards in 
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return by receiving more votes from individuals experiencing relatively positive economic change, 
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Appendix A. Weighting the KONDA Data 
Median population weight is 1,765, with a range between 832 and 5896.23 Table A1 
shows the effect of weighting on education. Top panel presents the unweighted distribution of 
education by year and bottom panel presents weighted distribution of education by year. Bottom 
panel education distribution is equivalent to TURKSTAT data by construction. Comparing two 
panels clearly reveals that high school graduates were over-represented in Barometre data set 
before weighting (especially for men). Moreover, over-education bias was stronger in earlier 
years. Since we pool years to increase the number of observations from different years, 
weighting is even more crucial for studies like ours. 
 
Table A1. Comparison of Barometre education distribution before after weights applied 
(whole sample) 










2012 52% 48% 67% 33% 
2013 51% 49% 65% 35% 
2014 50% 50% 65% 35% 
2015 50% 50% 65% 35% 
2016 48% 52% 62% 38% 
2017 47% 53% 62% 38% 
2018 46% 54% 60% 40% 
 Barometre, adults (weighted) 
2012 58% 42% 70% 30% 
2013 57% 43% 68% 32% 
2014 56% 44% 67% 33% 
2015 54% 46% 65% 35% 
2016 53% 47% 64% 36% 
2017 52% 48% 62% 38% 
2018 50% 50% 61% 39% 
Notes: LTHS: less than high school graduates. HSG: high school or above graduates. Weighted Barometre 









23 The corresponding balancing weights range between 0.531 and 2.851, and median balancing weight is 0.994. 
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Table A2. Comparing Administrative and Survey Data for Public Sector Employment 
(whole sample) 
 Administrative data Barometre 





2012     2,459,240  3,159,028 47,244,871 2,451,471 
2013     2,541,681  3,239,221 48,039,723 2,477,523 
2014     2,755,970  3,372,806 48,729,159 2,600,883 
2015     2,822,518  3,431,697 49,408,294 2,675,020 
2016     2,928,353  3,622,150 50,263,595 2,666,421 
2017     2,838,824  3,589,817 50,965,700 2,907,832 
2018     2,861,891  4,130,839 51,778,789 2,991,886 
Notes: Sources: Administrative data: https://www.sbb.gov.tr/kamu-istihdami/ Survey data: Barometre Surveys, 
2012-18. Population weights are applied for Barometre estimates. Administrative employment data is from mid-







































Note: Source Konda Barometre Surveys, 2012-18. Data is not weighted. The increase in the share of others in the 
bottom panel after mid-1980s holds even after weighing the data. 
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Appendix B. Extra Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table B1: Ethnic and religious identity of survey respondents age between 23 & 49 





















pious no yes 
2012 0.82 0.13 0.05 0.92 0.08 0.32 0.59 0.08 0.35 0.57 0.08 0.37 0.63 
2013 0.79 0.16 0.05 0.93 0.07 0.29 0.61 0.10 0.32 0.59 0.09 0.37 0.63 
2014 0.80 0.16 0.04 0.92 0.08 0.30 0.60 0.10 0.33 0.58 0.10 0.37 0.63 
2015 0.77 0.18 0.05 0.92 0.08 0.31 0.59 0.10 0.33 0.57 0.10 0.39 0.61 
2016 0.79 0.16 0.05 0.92 0.08 0.27 0.62 0.10 0.30 0.60 0.10 0.37 0.63 
2017 0.77 0.17 0.06 0.91 0.09 0.31 0.60 0.09 0.34 0.58 0.08 0.41 0.59 
2018 0.77 0.17 0.05 0.92 0.08 0.31 0.59 0.10 0.33 0.57 0.10 0.40 0.60 




Figure B1. Ratio of university degrees by birth year and religiosity 
 
Panel A: Women born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 
Panel B: Men born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 




Figure B2. Ratio of private high-status jobs by birth year and religiosity 
Panel A: Women born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 
Panel B: Men born between 1963 and 1995 (between 23-49 years old at the time of survey) 
 
Note: Source Konda Barometre Surveys, 2012-18. 
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Appendix C. Composition of Civil Servants by Occupation 
Most of civil servants are recruited via centrally administered exam (Public Servant 
Selection Exam, KPSS). We provide a rough breakdown of civil servants by occupation in Figure 
C1. Both the continual expansion of public employment as well as the purge af ter the 2016 coup 
attempt are visible in panel A. Figure C1 panel B shows that Ministry of National Education 
(MONE) and Ministry of Health employs at least half of all civil servants after 2010 for the years 
with consistent data. Permanent positions in these ministries are not recruited via interviews. But 
a potential route to recruit the in-groups is to disproportionately expand the employment favored 
by pious Sunni individuals such imams, religious education teachers. Also, police forces are 
known to have disproportionate appeal to conservatives. In Figure C1 Panel B the only occupation 
visibly expanding its share is health personnel (including doctors, nurses, health aides, etc.). 
However, imams and academics also experienced faster than average increase  in their numbers 
(55 and 62 percent versus 40 percent). Between 2010 and 2020, health and education staff account 
for 64 percent of the increase in the size of civil servants. The case Ministry of National Education 
(MONE) deserves further scrutiny because by far it is the largest employer in Turkey and it 
employs a significant number of religious education teachers. The number of teachers employed 
in the religious education directorate expanded rapidly starting in 2012 education reform, bringing 






















Figure C1. Civil Servants by Occupations 





Panel B: Percentage of Civil Servants 
 
Notes: We derived data from Annual reports of various ministries except for armed forces (we derived armed forces 
personnel total from various news resources). Armed forces include gendarmerie. We linearly interpolate missing data 
for Ministry of Health for years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 and for municipality workers in 202 0. Many 









Figure C2. MONE staff by education directorates 
Panel A: Absolute number of MONE staff by education directorates 
 
 
Panel B: Percentage of MONE staff by education directorates 
 















Main Sources:  
2019 - 2020 Administrative Reports for all ministries: 
http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/kurum/g/mi/kurum/Merkezi+Idareler 
  
Department of Water Services 2005 – 2020 Administrative Reports: 
https://dsi.gov.tr/Sayfa/Detay/759# 
 
Higher Education Statistics: https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/ 
 




Ministry of Justice 2006 – 2020 Administrative Reports: 
https://www.adalet.gov.tr/faaliyet-raporlari 
 
Ministry of Health Administrative Reports:  
https://sgb.saglik.gov.tr/TR,60674/stratejik-yonetim.html 
 
Ministry of National Education 2010 – 2014 Administrative Reports:  
http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/stratejik-plan/s/225/Milli+Egitim+Bakanligi+2010-2014 
 
Ministry of National Education 2012 – 2020 Administrative Reports: 
http://sgb.meb.gov.tr/www/dokumanlar/icerik/30 
 























Appendix D. Robustness Analysis 
In Table D1, we examine the changing employment status of headscarved women and also repeat 
of estimations in Table 2 by excluding Kurds from our sample. Last, we examine whether our PS 
and PS interaction firms are larger in the post-coup attempt period using additional interaction 
terms for post-July 2016. We aim to examine the impact of dismissals from public institutions 
following the military coup attempt in July 2016. At 5% the only significant post-coup interaction 
terms are PSxB1981-89xPost-coup for public employment of women and for all individuals. This 
might reflect that female public employees close the Gülen Cult might have lost their jobs 
following the coup attempt. 
 
Table D1. Determinants of employment, headscarf and post-coup controlled (2012-2018) 
  Public Sector Employment High Status Jobs, Private  
  Age 23-49, everybody Age 23-49, everybody 
  
Men and 
Women Men Women 
Men and 
Women Men Women 
Headscarf 
Headscarf - - -0.031*** - - -0.053*** 
- - (0.007) - - (0.003) 
Headscarf* born in 1981-89 - - 0.017** - - -0.017 
- - (0.006) - - (0.011) 
Headscarf* born in 1990-95 - - 0.084*** - - 0.008 
- - (0.011) - - (0.009) 
Adj. R-Square - - 0.187 - - 0.133 
Sample Size - -  56,408  - -  56,408  
Excluding Kurds 
pious Sunni  -0.001 0.015*** -0.018*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
pious Sunni * born in 1981-89 0.014*** 0.010 0.014** -0.004 0.013 -0.019** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
pious Sunni * born in 1990-95 0.037*** 0.017* 0.054*** 0.024*** 0.056*** -0.014 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) 
Adj. R-Square 0.166 0.153 0.181 0.113 0.075 0.126 
Sample Size 92610 45275 47335 92610 45275 47335 
Controls for post-coup attempt 
pious Sunni -0.005 0.010* -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.030*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
pious Sunni * born in 1981-89  0.020*** 0.012** 0.022*** -0.001 0.012 -0.014** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
pious Sunni * born in 1990-95 0.041*** 0.020* 0.056*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.008 
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(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) 
pious Sunni * post-coup  0.009 0.005 0.014 -0.012* -0.012 -0.010* 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) 
pious Sunni * b. in 1981-89 * 
post-coup 
-0.014** 0.002 -0.032*** -0.003 0.002 -0.007 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) 
pious Sunni * b. in 1990-95 * 
post-coup 
-0.008 -0.003 -0.011 -0.010 0.003 -0.023 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) 
Adj. R-Square 0.171 0.159 0.185 0.113 0.076 0.129 
Sample Size 110115 54025 56090 110115 54025 56090 
Notes: We control for education (less than middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), 
Kurd dummy, NUTS1 regions and interaction of five broad regions and survey years. Standard Errors are clustered 
at province level. Population weights are applied.  ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.10. 
 
 
Figure D1. Public sector and private high-status jobs employment (only women) 
 
Notes: The base year is 1969. Vertical axis shows the results of interaction between Sunni-pious dummy and birth 
year for the left panel and headscarf dummy and birth year for the right panel. We control for education (less than 
middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), Kurd dummy, NUTS1 regions and interaction 
of five broad regions and survey years. Standard Errors are clustered at province level. Population weights are 




Appendix E. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
We instrument a person’s self-declared pious Sunni identity with the share of pious Sunnis 
in the birth province of person (average of all survey years). We also considered alternative 
instruments such as religiosity of current place of residence. However,  this alternative instrument 
is endogenous to employment since high status jobs are concentrated in large cities and public 
sector employees are nationally recruited and appointed. At the very least people cannot choose 
where they are born and at the same time, a person’s province of birth and his current religious 
identification are closely correlated as reflected in the underidentification and weak identification 
tests reported at the bottom of Table E1. We follow Woolridge (2010) and interact share of pious 
Sunnis in a province with both birth cohorts (born in 1981-89 and born in 1990-95). Hence we 
obtain three instruments for three variables that includes the pious Sunni term.  
Table E1 presents corresponding IV results for OLS results in Table 2. Educational access 
varied significantly across provinces before 2000s in Turkey (Oyvat and Tekgüç, 2019). Our 
instrument is related to place of birth, so we were concerned with whether it also picked up the 
effect of educational access. Comparing coefficient estimates in Tables 2 and E1 reveals that they 
are very close. It seems that our instrument did not affect education-related control variables. 
Coefficient estimates from IV regressions for pious Sunni terms are very similar to OLS estimates. 
However, coefficient estimates for pious Sunnis born in the 1980s are significantly larger for both 
men and women as well as interaction terms for pious Sunni men born in 1990-95. For high status 
jobs in private sector, the coefficient sizes are also larger in absolute values. Interestingly, born in 
1981-89 and born in 1990-95 coefficient estimates in IV regressions are also significantly larger 
in absolute values compare to OLS estimates. To summarize, comparing OLS and IV regression 
estimates shows that according to IV estimates, a person born after 1980 is much less likely to be 
employed in the public sector in general but much more likely to be employed in public sector if 
he or she is a pious Sunni. In IV estimates, the overall predicted probability for pious Sunni 
individuals are similar to OLS estimates (especially for women) but for others, IV estimates predict 








Table E1. Instrumental variable estimates for public sector and private high-status jobs in 
Turkey (2012-2018) 
 Public Sector Employment High Status Jobs, Private  
 Age 23-49, all Age 23-49, all 
  Total Men Women Total Men Women 
pious Sunni -0.001 0.008 -0.019 -0.050*** -0.060* -0.045** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031) (0.019) 
born in 1981-89 -0.114*** -0.153*** -0.076*** 0.035* 0.036 0.033 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.032) (0.020) 
pious Sunni * born in 1981-89 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.063*** -0.060** -0.057 -0.055** 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.022) (0.024) (0.044) (0.026) 
born in 1990-95 -0.155*** -0.175*** -0.136*** -0.052** -0.120*** 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.033) (0.024) (0.026) (0.045) (0.030) 
pious Sunni * born in 1990-95 0.076*** 0.082* 0.072** 0.027 0.124* -0.023 
  (0.027) (0.043) (0.034) (0.038) (0.072) (0.041) 
Adj. R-Square 0.165 0.150 0.182 0.109 0.069 0.126 
Sample Size 109,545 53,727 55,818 109,545 53,727 55,818 
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NUTS1 regions fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 regions * survey year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 1151.968 346.13 581.315 1151.968 346.13 581.315 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 478.985 130.834 250.179 478.985 130.834 250.179 
Notes: We instrument three variables: i) PS with the share of pious Sunnis in the province of birth. ii) PS times born 
in 1981-89 with the interaction of share of pious Sunnis in the province of birth with born in 1981-89 variable. iii) PS 
times born in 1990-95 with the interaction of share of pious Sunnis in the province of birth with born in 1990-95 
variable. We lose some observations due to missing place of birth data. We additionally control for education (less 
than middle school, middle school, high school and university graduates), Kurd dummy, and gender in columns 1 and 
4. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Weights are applied.  ***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05, *: p<0.1.  
 
 
